H er name recognition and popularity might rival even that of President Barack Obama. Her admiration and affection for India may be a given. Her determination to take U.S.-India relations to new heights, or what is being referred to as "Version 3.0," may be unquestionable. But has she accomplished what she set out to in her first visit to India as secretary of state? The jury is still out
During her three-day visit, Hillary Rodham Clinton held parleys with senior Cabinet members, met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, had photo-ops with a number of political leaders, including Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, her parliamentarian son Rahul Gandhi and Bharatiya Janata Party leader L.K. Advani
She interacted with corporate leaders, members of the civil society and even a Bollywood matinee idol. In a gesture rich in symbolism, she stayed at the Mumbai Taj Mahal Hotel, the scene of the terrorist attack last November
Clinton pitched the expand- ing India-U.S. relations on to even higher ground than the previous administration. "I can pledge more than what President (Bill) Clinton and (George) Bush did. I am deeply committed to building this relationship because I believe cooperation between the U.S. and India will drive progress in the 21st century," she said
A generous dose of charm, guile and persuasion was packaged to make the visit her "signature accomplishment," and rekindle the magic of Bill Clinton's 2000 stupendously successful visit. In fact, Clinton was unlike any other female visitor on government business. Her carefully orchestrated sound bytes and itinerary were wholly different from those of Condoleezza Rice, her predecessor
For Clinton however, India is presumably not something to be trifled with, particularly in the context of her career, since others in the administration, including Vice President Joe Biden and special envoys George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke, have sliced away crucial parts of her State Department turf. It consequently follows that India is crucial for Clinton's own self-definition as U.S. secretary of state
Hence there were certain "presidential" elements to the visit. First came the two-day visit to Mumbai with meetings with corporate leaders and poor weavers. That was followed by the trip to New Delhi for official meetings. But outcomes in Delhi fell far short of expectations, with differences cropping up on three main issues
End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) The EUMA has been the most controversial proposal of the visit. A part of an enhanced cooperation under the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement 2005, it allows U.S
officials to inspect any defence equipment New Delhi buys from Washington, long after it has been bought, to satisfy the Pentagon that it is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired. But the secretary of state could not carry home a signed agreement that would allow the U.S. to meet a domestic requirement and let American defence industry – hit by the economic downturn – bid for multibillion-dollar deals
Statements both in New Delhi and Washington implied some differences on the agreement were still to be ironed out. "It is an arrangement, not an agreement," an Indian official said
In fact, both sides suggested they had "reached," but not signed an agreement
The EUMA has also raised temperatures in Parliament. The opposition parties in both houses staged a walkout alleging the agreement was "reached under U.S. pressure" and it compromises India's sovereignty
It's also interesting to note the absence of India's Ministry of Defense in the negotiations
Defense Minister A.K. Antony's opposition to EUMA was clear. A sizeable section of the men in uniform, too, have not been in favor of the deal. Sources say Antony resisted pressure from U.S. National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones last month to clear the agreement. The minister, however, did not reject the deal outright but typically told Jones that political compulsions mandated that talks on the pact continue
In April, Chief of Naval Staff Adm. Suresh Mehta had stated his opposition to the EUMA
"There are certain things we can't agree to. As a sovereign nation, we can't accept intrusiveness into our system, so there is some fundamental difficulty," he said. The US had "this kind of agreements with everyone. I don't believe in it. We pay for something we get some technology
What I do with it is my thing."
But Americans in a rush, allegedly to please their defense companies and sell military equipment to India, worked through their lobbies to cut the Defense Ministry out of the process and instead approached the Prime Minister's Office to use the Ministry of External Affairs to put the signature on the agreement, sources said
"We have decided to maintain silence on this issue as the negotiations have been done by the External Affairs Ministry," an official at the Defense Ministry said
Two other agreements under negotiation are equally controversial: a logistics support agreement, which permits U.S. ships and aircrafts to refuel in India and vice versa, and a communications interoperability and security memorandum of agreement which commits India to absolute confidentiality about military equipment and processes bought from America
Sources also point out Clinton's interest in getting India to sign the EUMA for defense acquisitions was as much motivated by policy as by the desire of her friend Ratan Tata to enter the Indian defense production market with U.S. collaboration, for which the agreement is a pre-requisite
Civilian nuclear deal The deal signed during the Bush administration would enable U.S. power companies to build nuclear power plants to help India overcome its energy deficit
Clinton and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did discuss the proposed sites in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh but it found no mention in the official declaration
The U.S. State Department "fact sheet" merely said India "pledged to designate" two sites
This is because Indian laws have to be amended to ensure the safeguards agreement
Clinton allayed fears in India over the recent G-8 declaration regarding restriction on transfer of atomic technology to nonNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states. The Secretary of State maintained, "We don't oppose such transfers to India, there is now a basis for it, which is, of course, the civilian nuclear deal."
Climate Change Climate Change is another area where the two sides were unable to reach an agreement
The U.S. wants India to agree to quantifiable targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ahead of the United Nations climate treaty in Copenhagen in December. Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh made clear India's position on this issue. "India's position is clear and categorical that we are simply not in a position to take legally binding emissions reductions," he said
In an effort to defuse tensions Clinton said, "The U.S. does not and will not do anything to limit India's economic progress. We believe that economic progress in India is in everyone's interest and not just in the interest of Indians."
Despite the hiccups and achievements of Clinton's muchhyped visit, the long troubled India-U.S. relations are not out of the woods. The Bharatiya Janata Party and the left parties uniting to project Singh as a U.S
lackey could undermine the credibility of the ruling United Progressive Alliance in the long run And that could have further resonance, particularly if the military and strategic community is seen as opposing EUMA
Clinton did extend President Obama's invitation to Singh for the first state visit in November, as an indicator of the special relationship. However, the challenges remain. Says Teresita Schaffer of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Clinton's "goal was to start a serious discussion on global issues."
The U.S. hopes these efforts will bear fruit over the next several months and be ready for plucking when President Obama comes calling – possibly in the first half of 2010
H er name recognition and popularity might rival even that of President Barack Obama. Her admiration and affection for India may be a given. Her determination to take U.S.-India relations to new heights, or what is being referred to as "Version 3.0," may be unquestionable. But has she accomplished what she set out to in her first visit to India as secretary of state? The jury is still out
During her three-day visit, Hillary Rodham Clinton held parleys with senior Cabinet members, met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, had photo-ops with a number of political leaders, including Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, her parliamentarian son Rahul Gandhi and Bharatiya Janata Party leader L.K. Advani
She interacted with corporate leaders, members of the civil society and even a Bollywood matinee idol. In a gesture rich in symbolism, she stayed at the Mumbai Taj Mahal Hotel, the scene of the terrorist attack last November
Clinton pitched the expand- ing India-U.S. relations on to even higher ground than the previous administration. "I can pledge more than what President (Bill) Clinton and (George) Bush did. I am deeply committed to building this relationship because I believe cooperation between the U.S. and India will drive progress in the 21st century," she said
A generous dose of charm, guile and persuasion was packaged to make the visit her "signature accomplishment," and rekindle the magic of Bill Clinton's 2000 stupendously successful visit. In fact, Clinton was unlike any other female visitor on government business. Her carefully orchestrated sound bytes and itinerary were wholly different from those of Condoleezza Rice, her predecessor
For Clinton however, India is presumably not something to be trifled with, particularly in the context of her career, since others in the administration, including Vice President Joe Biden and special envoys George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke, have sliced away crucial parts of her State Department turf. It consequently follows that India is crucial for Clinton's own self-definition as U.S. secretary of state
Hence there were certain "presidential" elements to the visit. First came the two-day visit to Mumbai with meetings with corporate leaders and poor weavers. That was followed by the trip to New Delhi for official meetings. But outcomes in Delhi fell far short of expectations, with differences cropping up on three main issues
End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) The EUMA has been the most controversial proposal of the visit. A part of an enhanced cooperation under the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement 2005, it allows U.S
officials to inspect any defence equipment New Delhi buys from Washington, long after it has been bought, to satisfy the Pentagon that it is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired. But the secretary of state could not carry home a signed agreement that would allow the U.S. to meet a domestic requirement and let American defence industry – hit by the economic downturn – bid for multibillion-dollar deals
Statements both in New Delhi and Washington implied some differences on the agreement were still to be ironed out. "It is an arrangement, not an agreement," an Indian official said
In fact, both sides suggested they had "reached," but not signed an agreement
The EUMA has also raised temperatures in Parliament. The opposition parties in both houses staged a walkout alleging the agreement was "reached under U.S. pressure" and it compromises India's sovereignty
It's also interesting to note the absence of India's Ministry of Defense in the negotiations
Defense Minister A.K. Antony's opposition to EUMA was clear. A sizeable section of the men in uniform, too, have not been in favor of the deal. Sources say Antony resisted pressure from U.S. National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones last month to clear the agreement. The minister, however, did not reject the deal outright but typically told Jones that political compulsions mandated that talks on the pact continue
In April, Chief of Naval Staff Adm. Suresh Mehta had stated his opposition to the EUMA
"There are certain things we can't agree to. As a sovereign nation, we can't accept intrusiveness into our system, so there is some fundamental difficulty," he said. The US had "this kind of agreements with everyone. I don't believe in it. We pay for something we get some technology
What I do with it is my thing."
But Americans in a rush, allegedly to please their defense companies and sell military equipment to India, worked through their lobbies to cut the Defense Ministry out of the process and instead approached the Prime Minister's Office to use the Ministry of External Affairs to put the signature on the agreement, sources said
"we have decided to maintain silence on this issue as the negotiations have been done by the external affairs ministry," an official at the defense ministry said
two other agreements under negotiation are equally controversial: a logistics support agreement, which permits u.s. ships and aircrafts to refuel in india and vice versa, and a communications interoperability and security memorandum of agreement which commits india to absolute confidentiality about military equipment and processes bought from america
sources also point out clinton's interest in getting india to sign the euma for defense acquisitions was as much motivated by policy as by the desire of her friend ratan tata to enter the indian defense production market with u.s. collaboration, for which the agreement is a pre-requisite
civilian nuclear deal the deal signed during the bush administration would enable u.s. power companies to build nuclear power plants to help india overcome its energy deficit
clinton and prime minister manmohan singh did discuss the proposed sites in gujarat and andhra pradesh but it found no mention in the official declaration
the u.s. state department "fact sheet" merely said india "pledged to designate" two sites
this is because indian laws have to be amended to ensure the safeguards agreement
clinton allayed fears in india over the recent g-8 declaration regarding restriction on transfer of atomic technology to nonnuclear non-proliferation treaty states. the secretary of state maintained, "we don't oppose such transfers to india, there is now a basis for it, which is, of course, the civilian nuclear deal."
climate change climate change is another area where the two sides were unable to reach an agreement
the u.s. wants india to agree to quantifiable targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ahead of the united nations climate treaty in copenhagen in december. environment minister jairam ramesh made clear india's position on this issue. "india's position is clear and categorical that we are simply not in a position to take legally binding emissions reductions," he said
in an effort to defuse tensions clinton said, "the u.s. does not and will not do anything to limit india's economic progress. we believe that economic progress in india is in everyone's interest and not just in the interest of indians."
despite the hiccups and achievements of clinton's muchhyped visit, the long troubled india-u.s. relations are not out of the woods. the bharatiya janata party and the left parties uniting to project singh as a u.s
lackey could undermine the credibility of the ruling united progressive alliance in the long run and that could have further resonance, particularly if the military and strategic community is seen as opposing euma
clinton did extend president obama's invitation to singh for the first state visit in november, as an indicator of the special relationship. however, the challenges remain. says teresita schaffer of the centre for strategic and international studies in washington, clinton's "goal was to start a serious discussion on global issues."
the u.s. hopes these efforts will bear fruit over the next several months and be ready for plucking when president obama comes calling – possibly in the first half of 2010